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Abstract—In the framework of Network Function Virtualiza-
tion (NFV), the reliability of Service Function Chain (SFC), –
an end-to-end service is presented by a chain of virtual network
functions (VNFs), is a complex function of placement, config-
uration and deployment requirements, both in hardware and
software. Previous reliability analysis models cannot be directly
applied to SFC because they do not not consider aspects of
system component sharing, heterogeneity of system components
and their interdependency in case of failures. In this paper,
we analyze service reliability of complex SFC configurations,
including serial and parallel VNF chaining, as well as their
related backup protection components. Our analysis is based on
combinatorial analysis and a reduced binomial theorem, and this
simple approach can be utilized to analyzing rather complex SFC
configurations. We consider, for the first time, failure dependences
among VNF components placed in data centers, racks, and
servers. We show that our analysis can easily consider different
VNF placement strategies in data center networks in arbitrary
configurations and, thus, be effectively used for optimizations of
the reliable SFC placement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliability of a complex system can be defined as a proba-
bility that the system will successfully complete the processing
of intended service. As such, reliability analysis in system en-
gineering is critically important to achieving system robustness
in case of any system component failures. In the framework
of Network Function Virtualization (NFV), the reliability of
Service Function Chain (SFC) presented by a chain of virtual
network functions (VNFs), is a complex function of placement,
configuration and deployment requirements, both in hardware
and software. SFCs suffer from processing vulnerability, i.e.,
failures caused by hardware or software, which can break
down the entire service chain and, thus, interrupt the service.
Thus, the reliability attribute of SFC is rather critical [1],
[2]. The most common failure protection technique is based
on redundant configuration and simply redirects the client’s
requests to backup components to maintain the service.
Previous reliability analysis models cannot be directly ap-
plied to SFC because they do not not consider aspects of sys-
tem component sharing, heterogeneity of system components
and their interdependency in case of failures. This makes the
reliability analysis of complex SFC configurations a challenge,
which has not been addressed yet analytically. Previous work
consider reliability of individual system components, such
as of a server, VM, link or switch, and optimize the end-
to-end service reliability by solving reliable SFC mapping
problem[3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. For instance, in [8], [9], authors
explored a server redundancy in data centers with server
failures to reduce the cost of nonblocking multicast fat-tree
data center networks (DCNs). In [10], a scalable and efficient
algorithm for VNFs placement and chaining was proposed
as a decision tree problem addressing physical link failures
only. In [11], the focus was on choosing different physical
nodes to place VNFs of SFC disjointedly, i.e., one VNF per
physical node, in order to avoid a single point failure and
increase reliability. Papers [12], [13] studied a reliability-aware
joint VNF chain placement and flow routing optimization for
the case of VNF failures, whereby the number of required
VNF backups was determined. These group of problems were
formulated as an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) model.
Previous studies that consider failures of multiple compo-
nents use assumptions such as disjointness and no interoper-
ability between failed components. Papers [14], [15] provided
a hierarchal model and reliability analysis based on Markov
models, queuing theory, graph theory, and Bayesian analysis
to predict service reliability by dealing with blocking, time-
out, network, program and resource failure. Such reliability
analysis does not consider any failure protection strategies and
assumes that service is reliable, when all service components
are available during service run-time. In other words, to
reduce complexity the analysis requires only a multiplication
of reliability in a component chain. In [16], a hierarchical
modeling framework is proposed of tree-based data center
networks, where server, link, switches and router fail. The
proposed hierarchical model consists of three layers, including
reliability graphs in the top layer, a fault-tree of the subsys-
tems and stochastic reward nets for the components in the
subsystems. Also here, an approximate reliability model is
provided, where all service components are disjoint and do not
impact each others. Since SFC reliability is highly dependent
on the reliability of individual components, whereby failure of
some components can lead to failure of other components, we
were inspired by idea from [17], [18], which for the first time
analyzed end-to-end service reliability as function of interde-
pendent hardware (server) and software (VNFs) component
failures. In this paper, we provide a complete and generalized,
simple reliability analysis, that considers failures of DC, racks,
servers and VMs and additionally system component sharing,
heterogeneity and multitude of components as well as their
interdependencies. Our analysis is based on combinatorial
analysis and a reduced binomial theorem. Surprisingly, this
simple approach can be utilized to analyzing rather complex
and generic SFC configurations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II
introduce a model of SFC. Sec. III gives a generic analysis
of SFC reliability. Sec. IV shows numerical results. Sec. V
concludes the paper.
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2Fig. 1. Placement of SFCs over Inter- and Intra-DCN: a) DCN reference architecture and SFC deployment; and b) Hierarchical Component Placement Model
and component interdependency.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We introduce the basic concepts of service function chaining
and VNF placement, component failures, and the related
failure protection as well as SFC classification.
A. Serial and Parallel SFC Placement
An SFC is generally an ordered chain of Ψ functions,
i.e., VNFs. VNFs are typically allocated by Virtual Machines
(VM) installed on servers in data centers (DC), whereby a
number of servers are located in the same rack [19], [20],
[21]. We generalize the data center network architecture as a
hardware fabric of switches, links, racks with multiple servers
and multiple VMs per server, as illustrated in Fig. 1a). Without
loss of generality, we assume that any DCN include four
types of switches: core router, Top-of-Rack (ToR), forwarding
switches, e.g., spine, and Virtual Switch (vS)) to provide
connections between DCN components, i.e., racks, servers,
VNFs, and between DCs. Core router provides connectivity
between Wide Area Network (WAN) and DCNs. ToR switches
forward traffi within a rack. The forwarding switches provide
connection to the core router. Each server can host multiple
VMs with as many resources as required for one VNF to
serve one user request. Thus, the main task of vS, e.g.,
programmable hypervisor switch with load balancer (LB), is
to select a legitimate VM instance, i.e., VNF, for any arrived
request and to provide a connection to ToR.
Embedding VNFs of a SFC within is a challenging issue
of building virtual networks with different objectives. As
illustrated in Fig. 1a), the SFCs of three VNFs, i.e., VNF1,
VNF2, VNF3, can be allocated in one DC, i.e., DC4, or
distributed over different DCs, i.e., DC1, DC2 and DC3
connected through WAN. Moreover, there are multiple options
to allocate VNFs inside DC. For instance, in DC4, different
SFCs can be allocated in the same rack or different racks,
in different or same servers, but also VNFs of a certain
SFC can be distributed over different servers or racks. For
example, Rack1 in DC4 allocates a SFC, which is distributed
over servers S1, S2 and S3, while, in Rack2, two SFCs are
allocated by three servers, i.e., each server provides two VNFs
of the same type. In contrast, in Rack3 (DC4), a whole SFC
is allocated by one server. Each VNF of a SFC distributed
over DC1, DC2 and DC3 is allocated by a separated racks
and servers as well. Thus, VNF placement can be based on
SFC, where VNFs of different types placed together, e.g., in
the same rack, to build SFC or based on VNF type, where
VNFs of the same type are placed together.
We refer to a large amount of IP packets passing the
same SFC as traffic flow. Generally, the traffic demand in an
SFC can be accommodated with a single traffic flow. On the
other hand, large flows can be split into parallel sub-flows
and uniformly distributed over the network. Traffic can be
spread over parallel SFCs using Equal Cost Multipath Protocol
(ECMP), a well known technique to improve load balancing
in servers and the network, i.e., to avoid server and links
overload. We model parallelism in three distinctive ways: 1)
Traffic Parallelism: the serial traffic flow is split into k parallel
sub-flows; 2) SFC Parallelism: all VNFs of the requested SFC
are replicated into at least k VNF instances to process k sub-
flows, resulting in parallelized SFC presented by k parallel
the so-called sub-SFCs; and 3) Path Parallelism: all k sub-
flows are independently transmitted over k link disjoint paths
and processed in parallel by k parallel sub-SFCs. Fig. 1a)
illustrates a parallelized SFC, where a request for SFC was
split into k = 2 sub-requests presented by solid and dashed
lines. Thus, SFC is also replicated providing k = 2 sub-SFCs,
one allocated in DC4 and another in DC1, DC2 and DC3.
As a result, the end-to-end service can be only successfully
completed, when both sub-requests were processed by VNF1,
VNF2 and VNF3, i.e., both sub-SFCs are available during
service run-time.
It should be noted that when flow and SFC parallelism are
deployed, we need to synchronize all VNFs of the same type.
To this end, an external state repository can be utilized to store
internal states of VNFs. After traffic and SFC parallelization,
each sub-flow needs to pass its own sub-SFC. That can be
implemented with SFC Encapsulation as proposed in [22],
[23].
B. Hierarchical Component Placement Model
As illustrated in Fig. 1b), and for the purposes of reliability
analysis there are C component types in the hierarchical tree
with C hierarchy levels. Each hierarchy level described by
a variable c, 1 ≤ c ≤ C, also determines the component
type. Considering SFC reliability with C = 4 components,
any component of type c = 4 is the lowest in the hierarchy
and the component of type c = 1 is the highest in the DCN
hierarchy. Considering different placement strategies in Fig. 1,
3it can be seen that some VNFs in an SFC are allocated in the
same components, e.g., DC4 and rack 2, and, thus, share these
components, i.e., rack R2 and DC4. We refer to any component
which is utilized by all VNFs from the same SFC, i.e., VNFs
of different type, as shared. In Fig. 1b), all shared components
are shown by dotted blocks. The SFCs in DC4 have a different
number of shared components, i.e., SFC allocated in R1 has
two shared components (R1 and DC4), similarly VNFs of
SFCs placed in R2 share R2 and DC4. The SFCs allocated
in S2 and S3 (R3) have three shared components each, i.e.,
server (S2 or S3), R3 and DC4.
The opposite of shared components are the disjoint com-
ponents that separate VNFs of a certain SFC. Thus, we
introduce the level of disjointedness ∆, where 1 ≤ ∆ ≤ C,
which describes the number of a hierarchy levels unshared by
VNFs from the same SFC, i.e., a number of component types
provided to place a certain VNF type disjointedly from other
VNF types. Since any VNF is placed in a separate virtual
machine, i.e., disjointedly from any other VNFs, the minimal
level of disjointedness is defined as ∆ = 1. For instance,
∆ = 1, when different VNF types are placed in the same
server, where VNFs are disjoint only, such as illustrated in
Fig. 1, i.e., SFCs placed in R3. The level of disjointedness of
SFC placed in DC1, DC2 and DC3 is ∆ = 4, where different
VNF types are placed in different DCs, racks, servers and VMs
and have no shared components. Generally, ∆ means that ∆
component types from lower hierarchy levels, i.e., from level
C −∆ + 1 to level C, are pre-reserved for a certain VNF type,
e.g., VNF1, and are disjoint from all other components of the
same type c, which are pre-reserved for another VNF type,
e.g., VNF2. We can also derive a types of shared components,
i.e., hierarchy level of shared components, which varies from
C − ∆ to 1, whereby the number of shared components is
(C −∆).
We also introduce a heterogeneity degree Nr, where 1 ≤
Nr ≤ C, which shows how many different component types
are utilized to separate VNFs of the same type. When VNFs of
certain type, e.g., VNFs3, are placed in different data centers
(DC), racks (R), servers (S) and VMs resulting in Nr = 4. In
contrast, allocation of a certain VNF type in the same server,
i.e., in different VMs only, reduces the heterogeneity degree to
Nr = 1. In Fig. 1, the SFC placement in R3 (DC4) results in
Nr = 2 as each VNF of a certain type, e.g., VNF2, has its own
VM and server, i.e., both VNFs2 are placed disjointedly in S2
and S3. However, the SFC placement in R2 (DC4) results in
Nr = 1, i.e., VNFs of the same type are allocated in the same
server.
Without loss of generality, using hierarchical tree concept,
for all n = k + r VNFs of a certain type placed in the same
fashion over DCN, where k ≥ 1 and r ≥ 0, there is a need
for n1, 1 ≤ n1 ≤ n, DCs, n2, 1 ≤ n2 ≤ n, racks inside
any DC, i.e., in total n1n2 racks, and 1 ≤ n3 ≤ n servers
inside any rack, i.e., in total n1n2n3 servers, and k+ r VMs,
whereby any server can allocate n4, 1 ≤ n4 ≤ k+ r VNFs of
the same type. To this end, we introduce a configuration set
 = {n1, n2, n3, n4} for a definition of a certain placement
strategy. For instance, the configuration set can be defined as
 = {1, 1, 1, n}, as  = {1, 1, n, 1} or as  = {1, 1, 1, 1} for
SFC placed in R2, in R3 or in R1 (DC4) in Fig. 1, respectively.
C. Component Failures
Failure of one component type can result in failure of
other component types, e.g., failed server will result in failure
of all VMs installed on it. That results in a hierarchical
interdependency of components, which needs to be taken into
account as,
• Data Center. The failure of data center can be caused by
a failure of connectivity through WAN, failure of core
router or connection between core router and forwarding
switches. DC failure results in failure of all racks, servers
and VMs relevant for building and maintenance of SFC.
• Rack. Rack failures can be a result of failure of forward-
ing or ToR switches as well as failure of links between
them. Any failure of a rack will cause failure of all servers
within it and all VNFs allocated in the rack’s severs.
• Server. Any server can be considered as failed (unavail-
able) in case of failures of server hardware components,
i.e., power supply, memory, etc., or due to failed link
between server and ToR or in case of failure of vS,
whereby all VMs allocated in the server will fail.
• VM/VNF. Since we assume that each VM reserves as
many resources as required for one VNF to serve incom-
ing request, failure of any VM causes failure of one VNF.
We assume that VMs, i.e., VNF, on the same server are
separated so that their failure has not any impact on any
other VMs, i.e., VNFs.
To consider the interdependency of failures, let us use the
model DCN as a hierarchical tree, as shown in Fig. 1b). The
root node is a DC, which belongs to the highest hierarchy
level. The VNFs represent a leaf nodes of the lowest hierarchy
level. The links between any nodes define interdependency
between components. In the presented architecture, the com-
ponents of the same type, i.e., of the same hierarchy level,
are independent from each other. The components of lower
hierarchy level do not impact connected components of higher
hierarchy level. For example, when we consider SFC allocated
in DC4, a failure of VNF1 will not affect the availability
of VNF2 and VNF3 placed in R1 and servers S2 and S3,
respectively (Fig. 1b)). The availability of S1, Rack1 or DC4
will be not affected by VNF1 failure as well. In contrast,
the components of higher hierarchy level impact connected
components of lower hierarchy level, e.g., a failure of R1 (level
2) will result in failures of all servers (level 3) inside this rack
and all VMs (level 4), i.e., failure of all VNFs (VNF1, VNF2
and VNF3). Additionally, for component failures, the failure
of a whole SFCs needs to considered. As shown in Fig. 1b), all
VNFs from any SFC in DC4 have some shared components,
i.e., SFC allocated in R1 has two shared components (R1
and DC4), VNFs of SFCs placed in R2 share R2 and DC4
and the SFCs allocated in S2 and S3 (R3) have shared server
(S2 or S3), R3 and DC4. As a result, a failure of any shared
component will result not only in failure of components from
lower hierarchy level but also in failure of an entire sub-SFC,
i.e., Ψ VNFs of different types.
4Fig. 2. Parallelized SFC with one backup sub-SFCs: a) Deployment of backup components; b) Hierarchical structure of complex service function chaining
and reliability classification based on placement strategy.
D. Failure Protection
Without any additional resources, any SFC is characterized
by a certain level of reliability, which depends on the reliability
of the underlying DCN components, i.e., DCs, Racks, Servers
and VMs reliability. To additionally protect the active VNFs,
any SFC can be enhanced by r backup VNFs resulting in
n = k + r sub-SFCs. The backup VNFs can then replace
any failed active VNF of the same type. Similar to active
VNFs, also backup VNFs can fail during service run-time. As
shown in [3], [24], to provide highly reliable communication,
there are multiple different strategies for active monitoring
of NFV, fast VNF failure detection and effective deployment
of active and backup VNFs. We do not explicitly consider
backup deployment strategy. Instead, we assume any service
as successful, if at least k ≥ 1 out of n VNFs of each type are
available during service run-time, while at most r VNFs can
fail without causing service interruption. Depending on SFC
placement strategy, a failure of a different component types
will lead to a different amount of failed VNFs.
Fig. 2 illustrates an example of the backup protection of
parallelized SFC, where a traffic flow f is split into k = 3 sub-
flows f1, f2 and f3, SFC of three VNFs (VNF1-VNF2-VNF3)
is replicated into k = 3 active sub-SFCs and one backup sub-
SFC (VNF1b-VNF2b-VNF3b). The sub-SFCs for sub-flows
f1, f2 and f3 are allocated in DC7. The first and second sub-
SFCs are allocated in Rack1. All VNFs of the first sub-SFC
are placed in the same server 4. In contrast, each VNF of the
second sub-SFC for f2 are allocated in different servers, i.e.,
S1, S2 and S3. The third sub-SFC for f3 is distributed over
three different racks in DC7 so, that each VNF has its own
rack and server, i.e., VNF1, VNF2 and VNF3 are placed in
S1 (Rack 4), S2 (Rack 5) and S3 (Rack 6), respectively. As a
result, the parallel sub-flows can be sent over parallel disjoint
paths. Each backup VNF of the backup sub-SFC is placed
in individual DC. In DC7, VNF1 and VNF2 of active sub-
SFC for f2 fail due to VM (VNF1) and server S2 failure in
Rack 1. As a result, the sub-flow f2 is redirected toward DC1
and DC2 to be processed by backup VNFs, i.e., VNF1b and
VNF2b. The active VNF3 of sub-flow f3 is also failed due
to failure of Rack 6 in DC7. Consequently, f3 is redirected
to the backup VNF3b placed in DC3. Although there are two
hardware and one VM failures resulting in lost of three active
VNFs of different types, the end-to-end service is successful
as all three sub-flows (f1, f2 and f3) arrive at destination and
are serialized into original flow f.
E. SFC Reliability Classes
In this paper, we assume that any component type c utilized
to allocate Ψ VNFs of a certain SFC have an equal component
dependent reliability pc, i.e., p1c = ... = p
ψ
c = ... = p
Ψ
c = pc,
where 1 ≤ c ≤ C and ψ, 1 ≤ ψ ≤ Ψ, shows the
VNF type allocated by component c. In this case, the SFC
build a reliability class ξ, whereby the component dependent
reliability of different component types do not need to be the
same, i.e., pc−1 6= pc 6= pc+1. Generally, there can be at most
N = n = k + r reliability classes, i.e., 1 ≤ ξ ≤ N , where
each sub-SFC has components with reliability different from
component reliability utilized by any other SFCs. Due to the
fact that, for a successful service completion, we need any k
out of n available sub-SFC, we do not need to differentiate
between active and backup SFCs, whereby both SFC types
can belong to the same or different reliability classes. As a
result, the component dependent reliability of each component
type c is noted as pcξ , where ξ shows the reliability class of
any component type c utilized to allocate VNFs from this
reliability class. Depending on placement strategy and the
reliability class ξ, there can be ncξ components of type c
inside a component of type c+1, whereby the configuration set
is noted as ξ = {n1ξ , n2ξ , n3ξ , n4ξ}. When all components
of a certain type c used for allocation of all sub-SFCs have
the same component dependent reliability, i.e., pc1 = ... =
pcξ = pcξ+1 = ... = pcN , i.e., all components from the same
hierarchy level have the same component dependent reliability
independent from sub-SFC allocated, these sub-SFCs can still
belong to different classes, at most N = n, or build one
reliability class. The first option is possible, if any sub-SFC
is placed over DCNs following different placement strategies,
whereby each sub-SFC ξ is, then, characterized by its own
characterization sets of a configuration set ξ, level of disjoint-
edness ∆ξ and the heterogeneity degree Nrξ , which is different
from all other characterization sets of other n − 1 sub-SFCs.
On the other hand, if there are n′, 1 ≤ n′ ≤ n, sub-SFCs,
which are allocated by components with the same component
reliability, i.e., pcξ = pcξ + 1, pc+1ξ = pc+ 1ξ + 1, etc.,
and all n′ sub-SFCs are placed over DCNs following the
same placement strategy, i.e., have equal configuration sets
5ξ = ξ+1 and level of disjointedness ∆ξ = ∆ξ+1 resulting
in the same heterogeneity degree Nrξ = Nrξ+1 , then all
n′ ≡ nξ SFCs belong to the same reliability class ξ. For
instance, in Fig. 1, the both SFCs placed in R2 or R3 in
DC4 build one SFC reliability class, respectively. The two
sub-SFCs in Rack3 have ξ = ξ+1 = {1, 1, 1, 1}, which can
be combined into ξ = {1, 1, 2, 1}, both have disjointedness
level of ∆ξ = ∆ξ+1 = 1 and the heterogeneity degree is
explicit, i.e., Nrξ = 2. In contrast, the sub-SFC allocated in
R1 (DC4) and sub-SFC distributed over DC1, DC2 and DC3
can not be combined into one reliability class as their levels of
disjointedness are different, i.e., 2 and 4, respectively. Fig. 2
shows n = 4 sub-SFCs from different reliability classes each,
i.e., N = 4, whereby each sub-SFC is placed in different
way and has different level of disjointedness ∆ξ. Moreover,
the heterogeneity degree Nr can not be explicitly defined
providing overall value of 2, i.e., VNFs of the same type are
separated at least by VMs and servers. As can be seen, some
sub-SFCs from different reliability classes utilize the same
component, i.e., R2 and DC7, which we define as follows:
The components of any hierarchy level jointly utilized by sub-
SFCs from different reliability classes are referred to as the
common root components. For instance, in Fig. 2b), the sub-
SFCs of reliability class ξ = 1, 2 have two common roots, i.e.,
R1 and DC7. Obviously, that any common root is a special
shared component, i.e., a failure of any common root results in
failure of multiple different reliability classes, i.e., sub-SFCs.
Moreover, DC7 is the common root of three reliability classes,
i.e., ξ = 1, 2, 3, while the sub-SFC of class ξ = 4 is placed
separately from other reliability classes and does not have any
common roots with them.
To describe the common root components of any type c
and all related reliability classes combined by this component
c, we introduce a set Φ = {cw1 , cw2 , ..., cwρ , ...}, where any
cwρ describes a component type and each wρ presents a set of
indexes of reliability classes combined by the component cwρ ,
i.e., wρ = {ξ1, ξ2, ...} and cξ1 = cξ2 = ... = cwρ . Since all
components of type C are always disjoint, i.e., use different
VMs, they can not be a common root component cwρ resulting
in 1 ≤ cwρ ≤ C − 1, i.e., DC, rack or server. Note, that
using the component type C − 2, i.e., server, as a common
root will result in the same placement strategies for all sub-
SFCs, which utilize this root. Thus, in case all components of
type C have the same component dependent reliability, i.e.,
pC1 = ... = pCξ = pCξ+1 = ..., all sub-SFCs connected
by this common root will be from the same reliability class
and, thus, the common root can be considered as a shared
component only. Considering the example from Fig. 2, the
configuration set for the common roots can be determined
as Φ = {2w1 , 1w2} with w1 = {1, 2} and w2 = {1, 2, 3},
whereby the presented parallelized and backup protected SFC
can be considered as a complex service function chaining.
Thus, a utilization of n sub-SFCs with Ψ VNFs each results
in complex service function chaining, when these sub-SFCs
belong to N ≤ n different reliability classes and, thus, include
a different amount of heterogeneous and interdependent DCN
components.
TABLE I
NOTATION
k number of parallel sub-flows and, thus, active sub-SFCs;
r number of backup sub-SFCs;
n total number of pre-reserved sub-SFCs, i.e., n = k + r;
Ψ a number of VNFs in a SFC and, thus, sub-SFC;
C number of hierarchy levels, i.e., different component types;
c a certain component type, 1 ≤ c ≤ C;
N total number of reliability classes, i.e., 1 ≤ N ≤ n;
ξ any certain reliability class, 1 ≤ ξ ≤ N ;
nξ a number of SFCs of reliability class ξ, 1 ≤ ξ ≤ N
n¯1ξ number of components from the highest hierarchy of reliability class ξ;
ncξ a number of components of type c inside components of type c− 1;
n1 a number of DC, if C = 4;
n2 a number of racks inside a DC, if C = 4;
n3 a number of servers inside a rack, if C = 4;
n4 a number of VNFs of certain type inside a server, if C = 4;
pcξ component reliability of any component of type c utilized to allocate class ξ;
p4 the reliability of VNF for C = 4;
p3 the reliability of server for C = 4;
p2 the reliability of rack for C = 4;
p1 the reliability of DC for C = 4;
Nr number of component types to disjointedly place VNFs of the same type;
∆ number of component types to disjointedly place VNFs of different type;
III. SFC RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Without loss of generality, we define service reliability as
a probability that at least k ≥ 1 sub-flows can successfully
traverse k out of n = k+r sub-SFCs to complete the requested
service, where r ≥ 0. Since each sub-SFC consists of Ψ
different VNF types, at least kΨ VNFs of each type have to
be available during service run-time. Our reliability analysis
assumes that any component type c utilized to allocate Ψ
VNFs of a certain reliability class ξ have an equal component
dependent reliability as previously discussed.
When backup sub-SFCs are placed so that there are r
backup VNFs, any components from any hierarchy level c and
any reliability class ξ can fail as long as they do not result
in a number of failed VNFs which is larger than r. However,
there is a need to take into account VNF placement strategy
and the interrelation between involved components of different
and same hierarchy level. To be able to control the amount of
components of any type and from any reliability class, which
can fail without affecting the overall service maintenance,
we utilize a parameter Acceptable Component Failures
(ACF) Acξ , i.e., the amount of failed hardware and software
components that do not lead to interruption of the service.
It is obvious that when no backup or other protection is
applied, there is no ACF and all active components, i.e., DCs,
racks, servers and VNFs, must be available during service run-
time. Without loss of generality, the ACF strongly depends
on the number of backup components and the placement
of VNFs from a certain reliability class inside DCs, racks
and servers. Additionally, we introduce a variable Λcξ , which
describes the number of remaining available components of
a certain type c, which were not affected by occurred failures
of any other components, but can still fail during service run-
time. Using these parameters, we next derive the placement
independent and placement dependent end-to-end service, i.e.,
SFC, reliability, which is generally the probability that at least
Λc − Ac out of Λc components of type c are available and,
thus, described by a well known Binomial formula determined
as
∑Ac
fc=0
p(Λc, fc, pc) =
∑Ac
fc=0
(
Λc
fc
)
pΛc−fcc (1−pc)fc , where
p(Λc, fc, pc) is a probability mass function of binomial distri-
bution. The utilized notations are introduced in Table I.
6A. Placement independent SFC reliability
In DCNs, where only components from the lowest hierarchy
level c = C = 4, i.e., VNFs, can fail and all other components
from hierarchy level from 1 to C − 1, i.e., DCs, racks and
servers, have reliability of 100%, i.e., p1 = p2 = p3 = 1
for any reliability class, the end-to-end service reliability is
independent of VNF placement strategy and the service is
successful if at least k out of n VNFs from any reliability
class are available.
Lemma 1: The placement independent SFC reliability is
only a function of the amount of reliability classes N , SFC
length Ψ, ACF for any reliability class ξ and the amount of
available components Λ, i.e.,
R(N) =
 N∏
ξ=1
A4ξ∑
f4ξ=0
p(Λ4ξ , f4ξ , p4ξ)
Ψ (1)
, where A4ξ = min{nξ, r −
∑ξ−1
ξ=1 f4ξ} and Λ4ξ = nξ.
Proof 1: Let us first assume that a parallelized SFC consists
of Ψ = 1 VNF types and all n VNFs have the same VNF
reliability p4 < 1, i.e., there is only one reliability class (N =
1). Thus, the SFC reliability follows the parallel reliability
model described by Binomial formula for calculation of the
probability that at least k out of Λ4 = n components are
available, i.e., R(N = 1) =
∑A4
f4=0
p(Λ4, f4, p4).
When, for instance, the reliability of all active VNFs and
all backup VNFs of a certain type is p41 and p42 , respectively,
and p41 6= p42 , there are two reliability classes, N = 2. Then,
the SFC reliability is determined as a probability that at least
k over all Λ41 + Λ42 = n1 + n2 = k + r = n VNFs do
not fail and at least k sub-SFCs can be composed to serve
k sub-flows. Since we assumed SFC of one VNF, Ψ = 1,
at least k − f41 active VNFs, where 0 ≤ f41 ≤ min{k, r},
and at least f41 backup VNFs have to be available, while also
f42 backup VNFs can fail without service interruption, where
0 ≤ f42 ≤ r − f41 . Thus, AVF of active and backup VNFs
is determined as A41 = min{k, r} and A42 = min{r, r −
f41} = r− f41 , respectively. Following the Binomial formula
and, additionally, applying the serial reliability model as VNFs
from both reliability classes, i.e., at least k, have to be available
at the same time; the SFC reliability is determined as R4(N =
2) =
∑A41
f41=0
p(Λ41 , f41 , p41)
∑A42
f42=0
p(Λ42 , f42 , p42), when
Ψ = 1, Λ41 = k, Λ42 = r and N = 2.
It is obvious, that this example can be extended to N ≤
k + r reliability classes, whereby it is required to extend the
equation above to up to N summations. In this case, the AVF
of any reliability class ξ is calculated as A4ξ = min{nξ, r −∑ξ−1
ξ=1 f4ξ} to ensure that the number of failed VNFs over all
reliability classes, i.e., from 1 to ξ − 1, is not larger then the
number of backup VNFs provided. Thus, the SFC reliability
for Ψ = 1 and N ≥ 1 can be generalized as
R′(N) =
N∏
ξ=1
A4ξ∑
f4ξ=0
p(Λ4ξ , f4ξ , p4ξ) =
A41∑
f41=0
p(Λ41 , f41 , p41)...
A4N∑
f4N=0
p(Λ4N , f4N , p4N )
(2)
, where R′(N) is a probability that there are at least k available
out of n VNFs of a certain type (VNF1) over all N reliability
classes.
Next, let us assume that the parallelized SFC consists of
Ψ > 1 different VNFs. Then, the SFC reliability is determined
as a probability that at least k over all k + r = n VNFs of
each type out of Ψ types do not fail and at least k sub-SFCs
can be composed by kΨ VNFs of each type to serve k sub-
flows. When all VNFs of the same type, have the same VNF
reliability, e.g., all VNF1 and all VNF2 have reliability p41
and p42 , respectively, the SFC reliability is a probability that
at least k VNFs of each type, e.g., k VNF1 and k VNF2, are
available as described by R(N = 1) above. Applying the serial
reliability model, the SFC reliability is R1...Ψ = R1(N = 1) ·
R2(N = 1)...RΨ(N = 1) =
∏Ψ
ψ=1R
ψ(N = 1) = [R(N =
1)]Ψ. In case all VNFs of any type, i.e., from VNF1 to VNFΨ,
utilized to build a certain SFC of reliability class ξ have the
same VNF reliability value, i.e., p41ξ = p42ξ = ... = p4Ψξ = p4ξ ,
at most A4 = r VNFs of any type can fail without any impact
on service maintenance. Then, the service reliability can be
generalized following the serial reliability model for the whole
SFC of Ψ VNFs as
R = [R(N = 1)]Ψ =
 A4∑
f4=0
p(Λ4, f4, p4)
Ψ (3)
Similarly, when there are N reliability classes and any re-
liability class ξ contains nξ sub-SFCs, all kξΨ VNFs from
the same reliability class have the same VNF reliability p4ξ ,
the overall SFC reliability can be derived from Eq. (2) as
R(N,Ψ) = R′1...Ψ(N) =
∏Ψ
ψ=1R
′ψ(N) = [R′(N)]Ψ ,
which results in Eq. (1).
B. Placement Dependent SFC reliability
When any DCN component, i.e., DC, rack , server and
VNF, can fail, i.e., p1 < 1, p2 < 1, p3 < 1, the SFC
reliability is a function of the amount of available and failed
active and backup DCs, racks, servers and VNFs involved and
their interdependence, which is a function of VNF placement
strategy over Intra- and Inter-DCN. Let us further simplify
notation as P (Λc) = p(Λc, fc, pc) to reduce the size of some
formulas provided below, where 1 ≤ c ≤ C, c ∈ {4, 3, 2, 1}.
Since our main assumption is that all components from
hierarchical level c utilized to allocate the certain sub-SFC
of reliability class ξ have the same component reliability
pcξ = pc, all Ψ different VNFs from the certain sub-SFC of
reliability class ξ have the same VNF component reliability,
i.e., p41ξ = p42ξ = ... = p4Ψξ = p4ξ , whereby all servers, racks
and DC required to allocate this sub-SFC from class ξ have
the same reliability as well. In other words, all n¯1ξ DCs, all
(n¯1ξ ·n2ξ) racks and all (n¯1ξ ·n2ξ ·n3ξ) servers have the same
component reliability p1ξ , p2ξ and p3ξ , respectively.
1) One Reliability Class: There is only one reliability class
N = 1, when all n active and backup sub-SFCs are placed
in the same fashion and all components of each type c have
the same component dependent reliability, i.e., pc. To allocate
all n VNFs of a certain type, e.g., VNF1, 1 ≤ n¯1 ≤ n
7active and backup DCs, 1 ≤ n2 ≤ n active or backup
racks inside any DC, i.e., in total (n¯1)n2 active and backup
racks, and 1 ≤ n3 ≤ n active or backup servers inside any
rack, i.e., in total (n¯1)n2n3 active and backup servers, and
(n¯1)n2n3n4 = (k+r) VNFs are required, whereby any server
can allocate 1 ≤ n4 ≤ n VNFs of the same type. Similarly, the
same amount of DC, racks and servers is utilized to allocate
each other VNF type from the same sub-SFC, i.e., VNF2, ...,
VNFΨ. Thus, the number of components from hierarchy level
c allocated to the SFC can be calculated as n¯c, if c = 1, and as
n¯1
∏c
c′=2 nc′ , while some of this components, i.e., ∆ different
component types from the lower hierarchy level, are utilized
for a certain VNF type only, other C−∆ component types are
the shared components and used to allocate VNFs of different
types. Thus, there is a need to consider the VNF placement
strategy and resulting level of disjointedness ∆, i.e., to take
into account the components’ interdependency.
Lemma 2: When there is one reliability class, N = 1,
the placement dependent SFC reliability is a function of the
disjointedness level ∆, SFC length Ψ, ACF Ac and the amount
of available components Λc for any component type c, i.e.,
R
∆
=
C−∆∏
c=1
Ac∑
fc=0
P (Λc)
 C∏
c=C−∆+1
Ac∑
fc=0
P (Λc)
Ψ (4)
, where
∏C−∆
c=1
∑Ac
fc=0
P (Λc) = 1, if ∆ = C.
Proof 2: Let us first assume that SFC consists of Ψ = 1
VNF types, e.g., VNF1 only, while all n = k + r active and
backup VNFs have the same VNF components reliability p4
as well as all DCs, racks and servers involved to allocate these
n VNFs have the same component reliability p1, p2 and p3,
respectively. Then, the SFC reliability can be calculated with
Binomial formula and the serial reliability model as previously
discussed in Sec. III-A, whereby it is required to consider the
availability of all component types involved 1 ≤ c ≤ C, i.e., a
minimal amount of DC, racks and servers is required to ensure
availability of at least k out of n VNFs, i.e.
R(Ψ = 1) =
C∏
c=1
Ac∑
fc=0
p(Λc, fc, pc) =
A1∑
f1=0
p(Λ1, f1, p1)·
A2∑
f2=0
p(Λ2, f2, p2) ·
A3∑
f3=0
p(Λ3, f3, p3) ·
A4∑
f4=0
p(Λ4, f4, p4)
(5)
To extend Eq. (5) to arbitrary SFC length, i.e., Ψ ≥ 1
VNFs, there is a need to consider the VNF placement
strategy and resulting level of disjointedness ∆. Since our
placement strategies are based on SFC or VNF type, C − ∆
component types are the shared components and allocate
a whole sub-SFC. Thus, the service reliability calculation
depends on the level of disjointedness, i.e., ∆, and the serial
reliability model can be only applied to R(Ψ = 1), similarly
as for Eq. (3), when each VNF type of a certain sub-SFC
is allocated by different components of any hierarchy level
c, 1 ≤ c ≤ C, resulting in ∆ = 4. In this case, any VNF
type is placed in different DC, different racks, different
servers and VMs and the service reliability is determined
with Eq. (5) as R∆=4 =
∏Ψ
ψ=1R(Ψ = 1) = [R(Ψ = 1)]
Ψ =[∑A1
f1=0
P (Λ1)
∑A2
f2=0
P (Λ2)
∑A3
f3=0
P (Λ3)
∑A4
f4=0
P (Λ4)
]Ψ
.
When different VNF types, i.e., sub-SFCs, are placed in the
same DC but different racks, servers and VMs (∆ = 3),
the failure of DC, i.e., the shared component, affects all
Ψ VNFs of a certain sub-SFC and, thus, needs to be
considered once and not separately for each out of Ψ VNFs.
Thus, the SFC reliability can be calculated by separation
the probability that there is at least Λ1 − A1 available
DCs required for maintenance of at least k sub-SFCs,
while the serial reliability model is still valid: R∆=3 =∑A1
f1=0
P (Λ1)
[∑A2
f2=0
P (Λ2)
∑A3
f3=0
P (Λ3)
∑A4
f4=0
P (Λ4)
]Ψ
.
Similarly, when different VNF types, i.e., sub-SFCs, are
placed in the same DC, same rack and different servers
resulting in disjointedness level ∆ = 2, there are 2 shared
components, DC and rack. Thus, any failure of DC or rack
will affect all Ψ VNFs and needs to be considered once
to calculate the probability that at least Λ1 − A1 DCs and
Λ2 − A2 racks are available to build k sub-SFC of Ψ VNFs
each. Then, the SFC reliability is determined as R
∆=2
=∑A1
f1=0
P (Λ1)
∑A2
f2=0
P (Λ2)
[∑A3
f3=0
P (Λ3)
∑A4
f4=0
P (Λ4)
]Ψ
. In
case of VNF disjointedness only (∆ = 1), i.e., different VNF
types are placed in the same server and, thus, in the same
rack and same DC resulting in three shared component types,
a failure of server, rack or DC will lead to a failure of a
whole sub-SFC, i.e., to a failure of all Ψ VNFs. Thus, only
VNFs itself are independent from each other resulting in SFC
reliability defined as R
∆=1
=
∑A1
f1=0
P (Λ1)
∑A2
f2=0
P (Λ2) ·∑A3
f3=0
P (Λ3)
[∑A4
f4=0
P (Λ4)
]Ψ
. As a result, we can derive
that the number of summations outside and inside the
brackets, in the formulas for reliability calculation above, is a
function of ∆ and the number of shared components. In other
words, the summations for the shared components are outside
the brackets, i.e., C −∆ summations, and the ∆ summations
for component types whose failure impacts one VNF type
only, are placed inside the brackets. Thus, without loss of
generality, the SFC reliability for any value ∆ is determined
by Eq. (4).
2) N-Reliability Classes: Now, we consider the parallelized
SFCs, whereby any out of n active and backup sub-SFCs can
belong to one out of N , 1 ≤ N ≤ n, reliability classes. Then,
an index ξ, 1 ≤ ξ ≤ N , shows a certain reliability class of
any active or backup component utilize to allocate the sub-
SFCs from this reliability class ξ. Thus, any component type
c utilized to allocate reliability class ξ and its component relia-
bility are noted as cξ and pcξ , respectively. Multiple sub-SFCs
can belong to a certain reliability class ξ, if these sub-SFCs
are placed following a certain placement strategy and all C
involved component types have a certain component reliability
value pcξ each. Note that all components of hierarchy level c
utilized to allocate any Ψ different VNFs of a certain SFC
reliability class ξ have the same component reliability, i.e.,
pc1ξ = ... = pcΨξ = pcξ . Generally, there are Ψ ≥ 1 VNFs per
sub-SFC, an arbitrary number of involved component types (C
types) to place this VNFs and an arbitrary number of reliability
8classes (N active and backup classes), whereby each reliability
class has its own level of disjointedness, 1 ≤ ∆ξ ≤ C. The
expression for the service reliability needs to consider the level
of disjointedness ∆ξ of any reliability class ξ. The level of dis-
jointedness ∆ξ take into account a certain placement strategy
and describes the amount of disjoint and shared components,
i.e., shared by different VNF types. Additionally, some sub-
SFCs from different reliability classes can have a common root
components, e.g., are allocated in the same DC or in the same
rack. The failure of these common root components result
in failures of whole sub-SFCs and related component types
belonging to different reliability classes. All reliability classes
combined by the common root and related root component are
collected in set Φ = {cw1 , cw2 , ..., cwρ , ...}, where any cwρ
describes a component type of common root, and each wρ
is a set of indexes of the reliability classes combined by the
common root component of type cwρ , i.e., wρ = {ξ1, ξ2, ...}
and cξ1 = cξ2 = ... = cwρ . Then, the resulting expression for
service reliability needs to take into account N ≥ 1 reliability
classes of SFCs of length Ψ ≥ 1, the shared and common
root components utilized for allocation of a sub-SFCs from a
certain reliability class ξ, i.e.,
Lemma 3: When there is multiple reliability classes, N ≥
1, the placement dependent SFC reliability is a function of
the disjointedness level ∆, SFC length Ψ, ACF Ac and the
amount of available components Λc for any component type
c, , whereby the shared and common root components utilized
for allocation of sub-SFCs from a certain reliability class ξ
need to be taken under consideration, i.e.,
R∆1,...,∆N (Φ) =
|Φ|∏
ρ=1
Acwρ∑
fcwρ=0
P (Λcwρ )·
·
N∏
ξ=1
Cξ−∆ξ∏
cξ=1
φ(cξ)=1
Acξ∑
fcξ=0
P (Λcξ)
[N∏
ξ=1
Cξ∏
cξ=Cξ−∆ξ+1
φ(cξ)=1
Acξ∑
fcξ=0
P (Λcξ)
]Ψ (6)
, where the function φ(cξ) ensures that the common root
components for any reliability class ξ ∈ wρ are considered
only once by the first summation over fcwρ ≡ fcξ , i.e.,
φ(cξ) =
{
1, if ∀ρ : (ξ ∈ wρ ∩ cξ 6= cwρ) ∪ (ξ /∈ wρ);
0, else.
(7)
Proof 3: First, we assume that the components from
different reliability classes do not have any common root
components, which corresponds to Inter-DCN placement of
active and backup sub-SFCs. Thus, the SFCs of a certain
reliability class ξ are placed disjointedly from any other
reliability classes. Assuming that any SFC contains only one
VNF, Ψ = 1, additionally relax the placement dependency as
there can not be any shared components. Then, the service
reliability can be determined based on Eqs. (2) and (5) as
follows
R(Ψ = 1, N) =
N∏
ξ=1
R(Ψ = 1) =
N∏
ξ=1
C∏
cξ=1
Acξ∑
fcξ=0
p(Λcξ , fcξ , pcξ)
(8)
, where failure and availability of each component type and
each reliability class are described by own summation. Thus,
all C component types, i.e., from type 1 to type C are
considered for each reliability class ξ, 1 ≤ ξ ≤ N . Thus, any
summation determines the probability that service will not fail
in case of fcξ failures of any component type c of a reliability
class ξ, whereby at most Acξ failures of this component type
c and class ξ are allowed.
Let us next assume that some sub-SFCs from different
reliability classes have a common roots, while there is not
any shared component types, i.e., SFC length Ψ = 1. The
failure of the common root components result in failures of
whole sub-SFCs and related component types belonging to
different reliability classes. All reliability classes combined by
the common root and related root component are collected in
set Φ, while any failures of any component type cwρ related
to the reliability classes from set wρ affect ACF Acξ and the
amount of available components Λcξ of all related classes ξ,
i.e., ξ ∈ wρ. Thus, to take into account the common roots for
different reliability classes, Eq. (8) for Ψ = 1 is modified as
R(Ψ = 1, N,Φ) =
|Φ|∏
ρ=1
Acwρ∑
fcwρ=0
P (Λcwρ )
N∏
ξ=1
C∏
cξ=1
φ(cξ)=1
Acξ∑
fcξ=0
P (Λcξ)
(9)
, where Λcwρ = 1 = const as there can be only one common
root cwρ for reliability classes from set wρ. The function
φ(cξ) determined by Eq. (7) ensures that the common root
components for any reliability class ξ ∈ wρ are considered
only once, i.e., by the first summation over fcwρ .
Next, let us assume that SFC consists of Ψ ≥ 1 VNFs
and there is no common root components, but some sub-SFCs
utilize shared components to place Ψ different VNFs. Thus,
each reliability class ξ has its own level of disjointedness
∆ξ, 1 ≤ ∆ξ ≤ C, and the expression for the service
reliability needs to consider the level of disjointedness ∆ξ
of any reliability class ξ, 1 ≤ ξ ≤ N . Only considering the
reliability class ξ which provides the level of disjointedness
∆ξ due to a certain placement strategy, there are C−∆ξ shared
components, i.e., shared by different VNF types, i.e., compo-
nents cξ = 1ξ, ..., (C − ∆ξ)ξ, and ∆ξ disjoint components,
i.e., cξ = (C − ∆ξ + 1)ξ, ..., Cξ. Then, similar to Eq. (4),
there are Cξ summations for each reliability class ξ, where all
summations for shared components and all summations for
disjoint components should be separated as each summation
for disjoint components is valid for each out of Ψ VNF types.
Thus, the service reliability is
R∆1,...,∆N=
N∏
ξ=1
Cξ−∆ξ∏
cξ=1
Acξ∑
fcξ=0
P (Λcξ)
[ N∏
ξ=1
Cξ∏
cξ=Cξ−∆ξ+1
Acξ∑
fcξ=0
P (Λcξ)
]Ψ
(10)
, where any Acξ and A
′
cξ
describes ACF of a shared and dis-
joint component type cξ of any reliability class ξ, respectively.
When level of disjointedness is maximal, i.e., ∆ξ = C, all
component types are disjoint and the same for all Ψ VNFs
and related components utilized for their allocation, i.e., all
9C related summations are inside the brackets in Eq. (10),
i.e.,
∏C−∆
c=1
∑Ac
fc=0
P (Λc) = 1, if ∆ = C. Similar, in case
of ∆ξ = 1, only components of one type, i.e., c = C, are
disjoint resulting in only one summation per reliability class ξ
inside brackets. When ∆ξ = C − 1, i.e., only component type
1, i.e., DCs, is a shared component for all Ψ different VNF
types of reliability class ξ, there is one summation outsides the
brackets, which describes the probability that there are enough
available components of type c = 1 to maintain the service.
Finally, when there are some shared components for VNFs
from sub-SFCs of length Ψ ≥ 1 as well as common roots for
different reliability classes described by set Φ, we can derive
the service reliability with Eqs. (10) and (9). The resulting
reliability equation takes into account N ≥ 1 reliability classes
of SFCs of length Ψ ≥ 1, their common root and shared com-
ponents and failures of any out of C component types involved
for allocation of a sub-SFCs from a certain reliability class ξ,
i.e., R∆1,...,∆N (Φ) =
∏|Φ|
ρ=1
∑Acwρ
fcwρ=0
P (Λcwρ )R∆1,...,∆N and
presents Eq. (6).
Finally, let us derive Eq. (7), where φ(cξ) needs to ensure
that the common root components are consider only once by
the first summation in Eqs. (6) and (9) and only component
types cξ which are not the common root components are
considered in the following summation to calculate the proba-
bility that there is enough available components of type cξ to
maintain the service. As a result, cξ needs to be additionally
considered, when either the reliability class ξ of considered
component type cξ does not have a common root components
with other reliability classes, i.e., ∀ρ : ξ /∈ wρ, or ξ have
some common root components with other reliability classes,
i.e., ξ ∈ wρ, but the considered component type c is not the
common root, i.e., cξ 6= cwρ .
3) Acceptable Component Failures: The bound of summa-
tions Acwρ and Acξ in Eq. (6) is what we refer to as the accept-
able component failure, which is a function of pre-reserved
components of type c from same reliability class ξ and the
failures of any other components of higher hierarchy level
or failure of preserved components of the lowest hierarchy
level over all reliability classes. Depending on the placement
strategy and, thus, the reliability class ξ, there is n¯1ξ active
and backup components of the highest hierarchy level such as
DCs and ncξ components of any type c > 1 allocated inside a
component of type c−1. Thus, there are in total n¯1ξ
∏c
c′=2 nc′ξ
components of type c utilized for allocation of nξ active and
backup VNFs of certain type of any reliability class ξ.
Without loss of generality, each summation in Eq. (6) is
a function of the prior summation, i.e., any Acξ and Λcξ
are the functions of already considered component failures
Acξ ≡ Acξ(f11 , ..., fc1 , ..., fC1 ,
..., f1ξ , ..., fcξ , ..., fCξ , ...) and Λcξ ≡
Λcξ(f11 , ..., fc1 , ..., fC1 , ...,
f1ξ , ..., fcξ , ...), where the previously assumed failures reduce
the acceptable failures of component cξ and the amount
of remaining available components of type c from class ξ,
respectively, where 1 ≤ ξ ≤ N . Next, we derive the amount
of available components Λcξ and ACF Acξ , where 1 ≤ ξ ≤ N
and 1 ≤ c ≤ C.
Let us first derive ACF Acwρ of the common root compo-
nents of any reliability class ξ from set wρ, i.e., ∀ξ : ξ ∈ wρ.
Since there is only one common root component per |wρ|
reliability classes, the amount of available roots Λwρ ≤ 1 and
the ACF of the root component is ether 0 or 1, both depend on
the number of failed VNFs of each type in case of failure of
the roots and failed roots from higher hierarchy level resulting
in failures of other roots. Thus, the failure of a certain common
root cwρ is only possible, when the other roots from the higher
hierarchy do not fail leading to the failure of this root cwρ ,
i.e., ∀ρ′, 1 ≤ ρ′ ≤ ρ− 1 : fcwρ ≤ 1, if fcwρ′ = 0 ∩ wρ ⊂ wρ′ .
In other words, the root component can only fail if it is
available, i.e., not failed due to failures of other components,
∀ρ′, 1 ≤ ρ′ ≤ ρ− 1 : Λcwρ = 1, if fcwρ′ = 0 ∩ wρ⊂wρ′ . As a
results, the amount of available common roots is defined as
Λcwρ =

1, if
ρ−1∑
ρ′=1
wρ⊂wρ′
fcw
ρ′
= 0;
0, else.
(11)
Generally, to maintain the service, the amount of failed VNFs
may not be larger than the number of backup VNFs, i.e., r.
The amount of VNFs of a certain type belonging to reliability
class ξ ∈ wρ can be calculated as ncwρ
∏C
c=cwρ+1
ncξ =∏C
c=cwρ+1
ncξ VNFs of class ξ, which will fail with failure of
the root component type cwρ . Since there are |wρ| reliability
classes affected by failure of root component type cwρ , the
total number of failed VNFs of certain type from any reliability
class ξ ∈ wρ is determined as
∑|wρ|
i=1
∏C
c=cwρ+1
ncξi , where
ξi ∈ wρ and ξi ≡ ξ. Since there can be other common roots
from the higher hierarchy level which affects the considered
root and other roots as well, there is a need to consider all
other VNF failures due to failure of all other ρ − 1 roots.
Thus, the amount of failed VNFs of certain type over ρ root
components can be calculated as a function of any fcwρ ,
i.e.,
∑ρ
ρ′=1 fcwρ′
∑|wρ′ |
i=1
σ=1
∏C
c=cw
ρ′+1
ncξi , where σ = 1, iff
∀ρ′′, 1 ≤ ρ′′ ≤ ρ′ − 1 : ξi /∈ wρ′′ , and ensures that the
failures of VNFs from the same reliability class are considered
only once. The formula above take into account placement
strategies, where, for instance, DC and rack inside this DC
represent two common roots for the same reliability classes,
whereby DC can combine more reliability classes and lead to
failure of rack if fails. Summarizing all constraints above, the
ACF of the common root components can be calculated as
follows
Acwρ =
1, if (r ≥
ρ∑
ρ′=1
fcw
ρ′
|wρ′ |∑
i=1
σ=1
C∏
c=cw
ρ′+1
ncξi ) ∩ Λcwρ = 1;
0, else.
(12)
where σ = 1, iff ∀ρ′′, 1 ≤ ρ′′ ≤ ρ′ − 1 : ξi /∈ wρ′′ .
The amount of available active and backup components Λcξ
of any component type cξ for any reliability class ξ, after
failure of any component of higher hierarchy level, i.e., of
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type 1 to c− 1, is
Λcξ=

Λcwρ , if ∀ρ : (ξ ∈ wρ) ∩ (cξ = cwρ);
n¯Cξ , if ∀ρ : (ξ /∈ wρ) ∩ (c = 1);
(Λ(c−1)ξ − f(c−1)ξ)ncξ , if ∀ρ : (ξ /∈ wρ) ∩ (1 < c ≤ C).
(13)
, where the first case determined as n¯1ξ = ncξ = ncwρ =
Λcwρ , describes a number of the common root components
of a certain type c and is the same for any reliability class
ξ from set wρ. However, when there is one reliability class
only, N = 1, there is no common root components and the
first case in Eq. (13) will be never true. The derivation of Eq.
(13) is presented in Appendix VI-A.
Generally, the number of any failed components fcξ of type
cξ can vary as 0 ≤ fcξ ≤ Acξ for shared components and
0 ≤ fcξ ≤ A′cξ for disjoint components from any certain
reliability class ξ, whereby any fcξ out of Λcξ components of
type cξ of reliability class ξ can fail without interrupting the
end-to-end service. Without loss of generality, ACF, i.e., Acξ
for components shared by Ψ different VNF types of class ξ and
A′cξ for disjoint components of the same class, is a function
of available components Λcξ of type c and a reliability class
ξ, the amount of provided backup VNFs r, and the number of
VNFs considered as already failed Fcξ after fcξ components
of any type c, 1 ≤ c ≤ C, and any class ξ, 1 ≤ ξ ≤ C failed.
The amount of failed components Fcξ of the lowest hierarchy
level C and a certain type, e.g., VNFs1, due to failures (fc′ξ )
of any component types c′, i.e., c′ ≤ c belonging to a certain
reliability class ξ can be generalized to an iterative function
as
Fcξ =
F(c−1)ξ + fcξ
C∏
c′=c+1
nc′ξ , if 1 ≤ c ≤ C;
0 , else.
(14)
, where the failures of any component from the higher hierar-
chy level, from 1 to c, are taken into account. These Fcξ failed
components of type C due to failures of fcξ components of
the type from 1 to c reduce the amount of available backup
components r, which are allowed to fail, i.e., reduces ACF.
The failure of any common root components cwρ are taken
into account by Eq. (14) as ∀ρ : fcwρ ≡ fcξ , if cwρ = cξ and
ξ ∈ wρ.
Then, ACF Acξ of any shared component, i.e., placed
outside the brackets in Eq. (6), is a minimum between
the total number of available VNFs provided by a certain
reliability class ξ and allocated inside component c, i.e.,
Λcξ
∏C
c′=cξ+1 nc′ξ and the total number of available backup
VNFs r reduced by any failures of any component type
and from any reliability class. The result will show how
many VNFs of a certain reliability class ξ may fail without
any affect of service maintenance. The amount of backup
VNFs is generally reduced by the VNF failures of class ξ
due to failures of the components from the higher hierarchy
level, i.e., from 1 to c − 1, and from the same reliability
class ξ, which can be calculated with Eq. (14) as F(c−1)ξ .
Additionally, the number of backup VNFs is reduced through
VNF failures due to failure of any shared component from
other reliability classes with an index which is less than
ξ. That failures can be also determined with Eq. (14) as∑ξ−1
l=1 F(C−∆l)l , where C − ∆l defines the lowest hierarchy
of a shared component related to the reliability class l. Thus,
defining ACF for component cξ, we need to take into account
that there are r−∑ξ−1l=1 F(C−∆l)l −F(c−1)ξ remaining backup
VNFs, which can fail without service interruption. Thus, the
amount of VNFs from class ξ, which may fail are defined as
min{Λcξ
∏C
c′=cξ+1 nc′ξ ; r−
∑ξ−1
l=1 F(C−∆l)l −F(c−1)ξ}. Since
we are interested in ACF of component cξ, which can be from
any hierarchy level, i.e., 1 ≤ c ≤ C, there is a need for the
normalization by the amount of VNFs allocated by component
cξ, i.e., by
∏C
c′=c+1 nc′ξ . This is also the number of VNFs,
which will fail if one component cξ fails. As a result, ACF
for a certain component type cξ shared by Ψ different VNFs
of a certain reliability class ξ can be derived as
Acξ =

min
{
Λcξ
C∏
c′=c+1
nc′ξ ; r −
ξ−1∑
l=1
F(C−∆l)l − F(c−1)ξ
}
C∏
c′=c+1
nc′ξ

(15)
, where the sum of all F(C−∆l)l identifies all summations in
Eq. (6) located prior to summation with a bound Acξ and,
finally, all prior failures of shared components. Obviously, that
if any prior reliability class l < ξ have disjointedness level of
∆l = C all Ψ VNFs as well as all related component types of
this class l are disjoint and there is no shared components and,
thus, summations outside the brackets for this reliability class
in Eq. (6), i.e., F (∆l) = 0. When ∆l < C, a failure of C−∆l
components types of a certain class l needs to be considered
for calculation of ACF Acξ , where l < ξ. Thus, the function
F(∆ξ−1)ξ provides a total number of the failed components of
lowest hierarchy level due to failure of any component types
up to ∆ξ − 1.
Similar, ACF for any disjoint, i.e., unshared, component
type cξ and any reliability class ξ, i.e., A′cξ for summations
inside the brackets in Eq. (6), is a function of the remaining
available components Λcξ of type c from a reliability class
ξ, the amount of provided backup VNFs r and the number
of VNFs considered as failed. Thus, there is a need to define
the amount of VNFs which may still fail without interrupting
the service, i.e., the minimum between the total number of
available VNFs provided by the reliability class ξ and allocated
inside component cξ, i.e., Λcξ
∏c−1
c′=1 nc′ξ and the amount of
remaining backup VNFs after failures of any other components
from any other reliability classes. Defining ACF of any disjoint
component type cξ, the number of backup VNFs r is already
reduced by possible failures of components from hierarchy
level 1 to C of all reliability classes l, 1 ≤ l ≤ ξ − 1.
These failures can be calculated with Eq. (14) as
∑ξ−1
l=1 FCl
failed VNFs from ξ − 1 different reliability classes. Some
VNFs from reliability class ξ could fail due to failures of
components from higher hierarchy level belonging to the same
class ξ, the number of failed VNFs from reliability class ξ is
calculated with Eq. (14) as F(c−1)ξ , which additionally reduce
the number of available backup VNFs. Moreover, the shared
components of any reliability class l, ξ < l ≤ N , i.e., these
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reliability classes are not yet considered inside the brackets in
Eq. (6), can fail resulting in
∑N
l=ξ+1 F(C−∆l)l additional VNF
failures. Thus, the amount of backup VNFs of a certain type
is determined as r−∑ξ−1l=1 FCl −F(c−1)ξ −∑Nl=ξ+1 F(C−∆l)l
and defines the maximal number of VNFs from the reliability
class ξ which may fail due to failures of component cξ, which
can be reduced through value Λcξ
∏c−1
c′=1 nc′ξ . To calculate the
amount of components cξ, which may fail resulting in allowed
VNFs failures calculated above, the required normalization is
performed similar to Eq. (15) as
∏C
c′=c+1 nc′ξ to determine the
number of VNFs allocated inside component cξ. As a result,
ACF for a certain component type cξ utilized to disjointly
allocate Ψ different VNFs of a certain reliability class ξ is
A′cξ=

min
{
Λcξ
c−1∏
c′=1
nc′ξ ; r−
ξ−1∑
l=1
FCl−F(c−1)ξ−
N∑
l=ξ+1
F(C−∆l)l
}
C∏
c′=c+1
nc′ξ

(16)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now evaluate the placement and component dependent
SFC reliability considering all possible combinations of dis-
jointedness level ∆ with minimal number protected component
types Nr resulting in 16 combinations following two place-
ment strategies. The first strategy is ” VNF placement based
on SFC”, where VNFs of different types are placed together,
and the second is a ”placement based on VNF type”, where
VNFs of the same type are placed together. We consider two
scenarios: 1) Case 1 relates to practice, where p1 = 0.99999,
p2 = 0.9999, p3 = 0.999, p4 = 0.99; and 2) Case 2 is
idealized scenario, where p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = 0.99999.
We investigate the SFC reliability over k = 1, 4, 8 active
SFCs with Ψ = 4, 8 VNFs and different amount of backup
SFCs r. We verified analytical results calculated with Eqs.
(4) and (6) by Monte-Carlo simulations. Since the simulation
results overlapped with analytical results (with 95% confidence
interval), we present only analytical results in a tabular form
for clarity, where Nr and in most cases SFC reliability values
are sorted in the descending order.
First, we assume that there is only one reliability class
N = 1 one active sub-SFC and evaluate the impact of ∆,
Nr, Ψ and r on the resulting SFC reliability. Tab. II shows
the SFC reliability for Case 1 and Case 2 as a function of
the amount of backup sub-SFC r, SFC length Ψ and different
VNF placement strategies defined through ∆ and Nr. The
related placement (Pl.) is marked with v for “VNF based” and
with s for “SFC based” strategies. Without backup protection
(r = 0), the SFC reliability is independent from Nr, since
there are no backup components. However, as expected, for
a fixed Nr the SFC reliability decreases with increasing level
of disjointedness ∆ and increasing SFC length Ψ (for fixed
∆ but different Nr = 1, .., 4 the reliabilities are identical). As
expected, Case 2 provides higher SFC reliability due to higher
component reliability defined, but reflects the same functional
dependency. Without any protection, a disjointedness of ∆ = 1
will provide the highest end-to-end service reliability.
Now, we consider the usual 1+1 backup protection, i.e.,
r = 1. At first glance, the SFC reliability decreases with
decreasing amount of backup component types Nr, and an
increasing level of disjointedness ∆, e.g., for Case 1 with
Ψ = 4. Intuitive, that seems to be a practical rule. However,
some placement strategies with low Nr provide higher SFC
reliability (marked bold) than some placements with a higher
Nr. In Case 1 with a SFC length of Ψ = 8, placement
with Nr = 3 and ∆ = 1 outperforms placements with
Nr = 4 and ∆ = 2, 3, 4. That is because the SFC in these
placement strategies will be most likely interrupted due to
VNF failures caused by the longer VNF chain. Then, if we
consider the VNF components of a SFC only, its reliability
relates to (p4)Ψ, i.e., the lower reliability of the longer SFC
chain, i.e., (p4)8 ≈ 0.92274 < (p4)4 ≈ 0.9606, can not be
compensated enough by the backup DC, rack and server. Thus,
the amount of other backup (hardware) components, i.e., Nr,
can be reduced. When we take a look on Case 2, where the
placement strategies based on VNF type are marked bold. In
this example we observe, that a placement based on SFC with
lower Nr outperform a placement based on VNF type, e.g.,
placement with Nr = 2 and ∆ = 1 outperforms placement
with Nr = 3 and ∆ = 4. Moreover, also other placement
strategies based on VNF type (marked bold) provide the lowest
SFC reliability for any value of r and Ψ and it is preferable
to use a placement strategy based on SFC.
Next, let us consider the impact of increasing amount of
backup sub-SFCs on resulting SFC reliability, where r = 100
can be viewed as a good approximation of an upper bound.
First, a more detailed rule can be observed for both use cases,
which also reflects the case without protection: For a given
value of Nr, the reliability decreases with increasing level of
disjointedness ∆, and, for a fixed value of ∆ the reliability
increases with increasing Nr. For instance, for a ∆ = 1
and descending Nr = 4...1, as can be seen for all r and Ψ,
the higher Nr results in the higher reliability. Furthermore,
the reliability increase with increasing redundancy, i.e., 0.9,
0.999, 1 with r = 0, 1, 100, respectively, for Nr = 4 and
∆ = 1 in Case 1. In contrast, with Nr = 2 and Nr = 1 and
∆ = 1 for both, the provided SFC reliability of “3-” and “2-
”nines is almost independent from value r 6= 0, respectively.
As discussed above and verified by the results in Tables II,
the highest SFC reliability in any configuration can be reached
with Nr = 4 and ∆ = 1, where each SFC is allocated in the
same server, but VNFs of the same type are placed in different
DCs allowing protection of DC, rack, server and VNFs, i.e.,
Nr = 4.
Thus, next we consider only the placement with Nr = 4 and
∆ = 1, which provides the highest service reliability, in setting
with k ≥ 1 active sub-SFCs and Case 1. Tab. III shows the
service reliability as a function of k, r and Ψ. The first column
contain the amount of backup sub-SFCs utilized normalized
by the number of active sub-SFCs. The increasing number
of VNFs in SFC, i.e., Ψ, decreases the service reliability. In
contrast, the increasing number of active sub-SFC significantly
increases the service reliability if r > 0. The reliability of “six
nines” can be reached with configuration k = 4 and r = 4 or
k = 8 and r = 4 for both Ψ = 4 and Ψ = 8, while serial SFC
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TABLE II
THE PLACEMENT DEPENDENT SFC RELIABILITY FOR k = 1 VS. BACKUP SFCS r AND SFC LENGTH Ψ
Nr ∆ Pl.
Case 1 Case 2
Ψ = 4 Ψ = 8 Ψ = 4 Ψ = 8
r = 0 r = 1 r = 100 r = 0 r = 1 r = 100 r = 0 r = 1 r = 100 r = 0 r = 1 r = 100
4 1 s 0.9595298551 0.9995123444 → 1 0.9217205502 0.9990295230 → 1 0.9999300030 0.9999999963 → 1 0.9998900055 0.9999999935 → 1
4 2 s 0.9566541431 0.9995075495 → 1 0.9152878303 0.9990157556 → 1 0.9999000045 0.9999999948 → 1 0.9998200153 0.9999999900 → 1
4 3 s 0.9563671756 0.9995073731 → 1 0.9146473210 0.9990150262 → 1 0.9998700078 0.9999999939 → 1 0.9997500300 0.9999999879 → 1
4 4 v, s 0.9563384848 0.9995073585 → 1 0.9145832976 0.9990149596 → 1 0.9998400120 0.9999999936 → 1 0.9996800496 0.9999999872 → 1
3 1 s 0.9595298551 0.9995031488 0.9999899999 0.9217205502 0.9990210788 0.9999899999 0.9999300030 0.9999899976 0.9999899999 0.9998900055 0.9999899956 0.9999899999
3 2 s 0.9566541431 0.9994984114 0.9999899999 0.9152878303 0.9990074399 0.9999899999 0.9999000045 0.9999899967 0.9999899999 0.9998200153 0.9999899935 0.9999899999
3 3 v, s 0.9563671756 0.9994982407 0.9999899999 0.9146473210 0.9990067233 0.9999899999 0.9998700078 0.9999899964 0.9999899999 0.9997500300 0.9999899928 0.9999899999
3 4 v 0.9563384848 0.9994682561 0.9999600006 0.9145832976 0.9989367949 0.9999200028 0.9998400120 0.9999599970 0.9999600006 0.9996800496 0.9999199956 0.9999200028
2 1 s 0.9595298551 0.9994111840 0.9998900009 0.9217205502 0.9989366284 0.9998900009 0.9999300030 0.9999799988 0.9999800001 0.9998900055 0.9999799976 0.9999800001
2 2 v, s 0.9566541431 0.9994070213 0.9998900009 0.9152878303 0.9989242748 0.9998900009 0.9999000045 0.9999799985 0.9999800001 0.9998200153 0.9999799969 0.9999800001
2 3 v 0.9563671756 0.9991072291 0.9995900640 0.9146473210 0.9982252375 0.9991902879 0.9998700078 0.9999499994 0.9999500010 0.9997500300 0.9999100004 0.9999100036
2 4 v 0.9563384848 0.9990772562 0.9995600766 0.9145832976 0.9981553639 0.9991203467 0.9998400120 0.9999200012 0.9999200028 0.9996800496 0.9998400088 0.9998400120
1 1 v, s 0.9595298551 0.9984906149 0.9988901109 0.9217205502 0.9980912785 0.9988901109 0.9999300030 0.9999699999 0.9999700003 0.9998900055 0.9999699995 0.9999700003
1 2 v 0.9566541431 0.9954981375 0.9958964363 0.9152878303 0.9911255646 0.9919188219 0.9999000045 0.9999400011 0.9999400015 0.9998200153 0.9999000037 0.9999000045
1 3 v 0.9563671756 0.9951995179 0.9955976973 0.9146473210 0.9904319848 0.9912246871 0.9998700078 0.9999100032 0.9999100036 0.9997500300 0.9998300128 0.9998300136
1 4 v 0.9563384848 0.9951696622 0.9955678297 0.9145832976 0.9903626567 0.9911553034 0.9998400120 0.9998800062 0.9998800066 0.9996800496 0.9997600268 0.9997600276
TABLE III
SERVICE RELIABILITY PROVIDED BY PL. WITH Nr = 4 AND ∆ = 1 VS. A NUMBER OF PARALLEL ACTIVE k AND BACKUP r SUB-SFCS.
Ψ = 4 Ψ = 8
r
k
k = 1 k = 4 k = 8 k = 1 k = 4 k = 8
0 0.959529855054096 0.847683965207723 0.718568104870289 0.921720550240843 0.721767099608634 0.520947746077460
0.125 - - 0.983696719311009 - - 0.968371471691151
0.25 - 0.995273874413365 0.999384198321856 - 0.990697185787667 0.998774974539633
0.375 - - 0.999981195954079 - - 0.999962424513603
0.5 - 0.999893621626573 0.999999500094456 - 0.999787784003278 0.999999000321022
0.625 - - 0.999999987999969 - - 0.999999976000402
0.75 - 0.999997932451063 0.999999999734000 - 0.999995866449611 0.999999999468002
0.875 - - 0.999999999994470 - - 0.999999999988942
1 0.999512344397461 0.999999963313851 0.999999999999890 0.999029523012867 0.999999926631523 0.999999999999781
1.125 - - 0.999999999999997 - - 0.999999999999995
1.25 - 0.999999999389706 0.999999999999999 - 0.999999998779421 0.999999999999998
1.375 - - 0.999999999999999 - - 0.999999999999999
TABLE IV
SERVICE RELIABILITY WITH N = 2 DIFFERENT RELIABILITY CLASSES IN CONFIGURATION k = 4, r = 3 AND Ψ = 4.
active\backipNr 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3
Nr ∆ 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
4 1 0.9999979324510640 0.9999979318655040 0.9999979318286700 0.9999979318251840 0.9999964124393610 0.9999964118583170 0.9999964118218760 0.9999961885402720
4 2 0.9999979317835310 0.9999979317005130 0.9999979316975760 0.9999979316973230 0.9999963106145000 0.9999963105326350 0.9999963105297770 0.9999961883993840
4 3 0.9999979317535350 0.9999979316968350 0.9999979316951940 0.9999979316950590 0.9999963005396360 0.9999963004838190 0.9999963004822340 0.9999961883957160
4 4 0.9999979317508330 0.9999979316965460 0.9999979316950160 0.9999979316948910 0.9999962995331520 0.9999962994797230 0.9999962994782460 0.9999961883954060
3 1 0.9999879366414630 0.9999879360639370 0.9999879360276900 0.9999879360242610 0.9999864169785840 0.9999864164055270 0.9999864163696700 0.9999861942812340
3 2 0.9999879359819710 0.9999879359019470 0.9999879358991620 0.9999879358989240 0.9999863151586640 0.9999863150797630 0.9999863150770560 0.9999861941428650
3 3 0.9999879359525630 0.9999879358984220 0.9999879358968970 0.9999879358967720 0.9999863050840810 0.9999863050307960 0.9999863050293240 0.9999861941393090
3 4 0.9999579366144800 0.9999579365603410 0.9999579365588160 0.9999579365586910 0.9999563057949240 0.9999563057416410 0.9999563057401690 0.9999561948534810
2 1 0.9998879792477240 0.9998879787470810 0.9998879787164170 0.9998879787135260 0.9998864630738730 0.9998864625772640 0.9998864625469480 0.9998862523920450
2 2 0.9998879786661850 0.9998879786134870 0.9998879786120130 0.9998879786118920 0.9998863613009290 0.9998863612490670 0.9998863612476450 0.9998862522773380
2 3 0.9995880422682250 0.9995880422155420 0.9995880422140690 0.9995880422139490 0.9995864253881300 0.9995864253362840 0.9995864253348620 0.9995863163972430
2 4 0.9995580549268320 0.9995580548741510 0.9995580548726770 0.9995580548725570 0.9995564380952430 0.9995564380433980 0.9995564380419760 0.9995563291076250
1 1 0.9988884761855780 0.9988884761457560 0.9988884761447220 0.9988884761446380 0.9988869949822420 0.9988869949430760 0.9988869949420800 0.9988869043083370
1 2 0.9958948064235610 0.9958948063838590 0.9958948063828270 0.9958948063827440 0.9958933296593930 0.9958933296203440 0.9958933296193510 0.9958932392572380
1 3 0.9955960678574820 0.9955960678177920 0.9955960678167610 0.9955960678166780 0.9955945915362990 0.9955945914972620 0.9955945914962690 0.9955945011612620
1 4 0.9955662002741250 0.9955662002344360 0.9955662002334050 0.9955662002333220 0.9955647239972310 0.9955647239581950 0.9955647239572020 0.9955646336249050
(k = 1) requires r = 3 backup sub-SFCs, which means 300%
redundancy.
Finally, we investigate the SFC reliability as a function
of placement strategies different for active and backup SFCs
resulting in N = 2 different reliability classes. We use
configuration with k = 4, r = 3, Ψ = 4 and component
reliability defined for Case 1. Tab. IV shows the resulting
SFC reliability, where the first two columns and the two
upper rows (Nr and ∆) describe placement strategy of active
and backup sub-SFCs, respectively. Also here the general
rule is for a fixed Nr the SFC reliability decreases with
increasing level of disjointedness ∆. Thus, we show the results
for backup placement for Nr = 4, 3 as that provides the
highest SFC reliability. However, the highest reliability of ‘five
nines’ can be reached, when active sub-SFCs are placed with
heterogeneity degree Nr = 4 (marked bold italic).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provided a complete and generalized,
simple reliability analysis, that considers system component
sharing, heterogeneity and multitude of components as well as
their interdependencies. Our analysis is based on combinatorial
analysis and a reduced binomial theorem. Surprisingly, this
simple approach could be utilized to analyzing rather com-
plex and generic SFC configurations. The analytical results
confirmed by simulation showed some trade-offs between
component heterogeneity and disjointedness for SFC place-
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ment, whereby the increasing disjointedness level does not
automatically lead to the highest SFC reliability.
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VI. APPENDIX
A. Derivation of Eq. (13)
Since all components of a certain reliability class are placed
separately from components of any other reliability class and
only some common root components cwρ can be utilized to
combine different classes, there is a need to consider each
reliability class ξ separately, whereby Λcξ is a functions of
VNF placement strategy and amount of available and failed
components related to the reliability class ξ. Since DCs are the
components from the highest hierarchy level and independent
from failures of any other component types, the amount of
available DCs is equal to the amount of data centers required to
allocate nξ sub-SFCs of reliability class ξ, i.e., Λ1ξ = n¯1ξ . The
failure of f1ξ DCs causes a failure of f1ξn2ξ racks reducing
the overall number of available racks as Λ2ξ = (Λ1ξ−f1ξ)n2ξ ,
where Λ2ξ ≡ Λcξ = (Λc−1ξ − fc−1ξ)ncξ . Then, the re-
maining amount of servers after DC and rack failures is
Λ3ξ = ((Λ1ξ − f1ξ)n2ξ − f2ξ)n3ξ = (Λ2ξ − f2ξ)n3ξ , where
Λ3ξ ≡ Λcξ = (Λc−1ξ − fc−1ξ)ncξ . After failures of f1ξ DCs,
f2ξ racks and f3ξ servers the remaining amount of VNFs of
any type is Λ4ξ = (((Λ1ξ − f1ξ)n2ξ − f2ξ)n3ξ − f3ξ)n4ξ =
(Λ3ξ − f3ξ)n4ξ ≡ (Λc−1ξ − fc−1ξ)ncξ , if cξ = 4. Since
some reliability classes have a common root component cwρ ,
which impact any reliability class ξ, ξ ∈ wρ, there is a
need to consider the availability and failure of common root
components from a set Φ as ncξ ≡ ncwρ = Λcwρ for any
ξ ∈ wρ. Thus, the general expression for the amount of
available components of any type c from a reliability class
ξ is represented by Eq. (13).
